Cheque Bouncing & Dishonour in India:- A Case Law Analysis
Cheque Bouncing & Dishonour in India:- A Case Law Analysis
The dishonoured cheque is the most litigated instrument in India. It is drawn in the ordinary course of trade — against a supply, a loan, a rent, a settlement — and when the bank returns it, the payee finds himself holding not a debt but an offence. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, inserted in 1988 and rewritten by amendment four times since, was enacted to lend credibility to the cheque as a means of payment by making its dishonour punishable. The provision is penal in form and compensatory in substance, and almost every difficulty it has produced flows from that hybrid character.
What the courts have built on that short section is a code of its own. Almost every question that decides a case in the trial court has been settled, and several of them resettled, by the Supreme Court. Kusum Ingots fixed the ingredients; MSR Leathers freed the payee to present again; Rangappa carried the presumption all the way to the debt; Aneeta Hada made the company an indispensable accused; Dashrath Rupsingh moved the forum and Parliament moved it back. What follows reads these decisions together, as a single conversation between the courts and the drawers, payees and directors who live with the section.
The offence under section 138 is in substance a civil wrong to which criminal consequences have been attached — the premise from which the compounding, compensation and interim payment decisions all proceed.
One returned cheque engages at least seven distinct enquiries: whether the statutory clock was kept, whether the debt was legally enforceable, who within a company must answer, where the complaint lies, what the drawer must pay before he is heard, how the matter may be ended without a verdict, and whether the defence raised is one the section recognises at all. Each has its own gatekeeper and its own standard, and the practitioner’s first task is to know which enquiry a given set of facts opens.
The clock — the ingredients and the two windows
Section 138 is a provision of dates before it is anything else. The cheque must be presented within its validity, the notice must go within thirty days of the return memo, the drawer has fifteen days to pay, and the complaint must follow within thirty days of that. Miss a window and there is no offence to try.
| Authority | Ratio decidendi | Practice insight |
|---|---|---|
| Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. (2000) 2 SCC 745 · SC (2J) · The ingredients of s. 138 | The offence is constituted only when each of the five ingredients is satisfied — presentation within validity, return for insufficiency of funds or exceeding the arrangement, a written demand within the statutory period, failure to pay within fifteen days of its receipt, and a complaint within limitation. The absence of any one is fatal. | Plead the five ingredients as five separate averments with dates and documents. For the defence, the cheapest point is almost always a date, taken before evidence. |
| MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan (2013) 1 SCC 177 · SC (3J) · Successive presentation | There is no bar to a complaint founded on a second or subsequent dishonour of the same cheque where no complaint was filed on the earlier default. The contrary rule in Sadanandan Bhadran, which allowed only one cause of action per cheque, is overruled. | A payee who has sent a notice but not sued may present again within validity and start the clock afresh. What he may not do is prosecute twice on the same default. |
| Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey (2014) 10 SCC 713 · SC (3J) · Premature complaint | No complaint may be filed before the fifteen-day period expires, because until then no offence has been committed. Cognizance taken on a premature complaint is without jurisdiction, and the defect is not cured by the subsequent expiry of the period. | Check the filing date against the notice-service date before anything else. The payee’s remedy is a fresh complaint with an application under the proviso to s. 142(1)(b), not an amendment. |
| Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom Industries Ltd. (2014) 11 SCC 769 · SC (3J) · Computing the period | In computing the fifteen-day period, the day on which the notice is received is excluded; the rule in s. 9 of the General Clauses Act applies. The complaint is therefore competent on the day after the fifteen days expire. | The single most common miscalculation in practice. Compute from the day after service, and file on or after the sixteenth day — not on the fifteenth. |
| C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed (2007) 6 SCC 555 · SC (3J) · Service of the notice | A notice sent by registered post to the correct address is presumed served under s. 27 of the General Clauses Act, and the drawer cannot defeat the section by refusing or avoiding it. A drawer who claims not to have received it may pay within fifteen days of receiving the summons. | Send by registered post with acknowledgment and retain the tracking record; a returned or unclaimed cover is good service. For the drawer, non-receipt is a plea to be proved, not asserted. |
The presumption — and what it takes to rebut it
Once the signature is admitted or proved, the law does the complainant’s work for him. Sections 118(a) and 139 presume consideration and a legally enforceable debt, and the drawer carries a reverse onus discharged on the balance of probabilities.
The complainant proves the cheque
The signature is admitted or proved. Section 118(a) presumes consideration and section 139 presumes that the cheque was received in discharge of a debt or liability. Nothing further need be led at this stage.
The accused must raise a probable defence
The onus is on the drawer, and it is discharged on the preponderance of probabilities. He may rely on the complainant’s own evidence and on the circumstances; he need not enter the witness box. A bare denial will not do.
The onus returns to the complainant
Once a probable defence is raised, the presumption is displaced and the complainant must prove the debt as a matter of fact — failing which the drawer is entitled to an acquittal.
| Authority | Ratio decidendi | Practice insight |
|---|---|---|
| Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 · SC (3J) · s. 139; the extent of the presumption | The presumption under s. 139 extends not merely to the issue of the cheque but to the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. It is rebuttable, and the accused may discharge the onus on the preponderance of probabilities, relying on the material already on record. | The foundational authority for the complainant. For the drawer, the answer is never a denial — it is a positive, probable and documented account of why the cheque was with the payee. |
| Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418 · SC (2J) · The principles collected | The principles governing ss. 118(a) and 139 are summarised: the presumptions are mandatory but rebuttable; the accused need not adduce his own evidence and may rely on the complainant’s; and where the complainant’s financial capacity is put in issue and left unexplained, the presumption may be held rebutted. | The checklist both sides argue from. Where capacity is the defence, put it in issue specifically in cross-examination — a suggestion not put cannot later be argued. |
| Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 197 · SC (2J) · The blank signed cheque | Where a signed blank cheque is voluntarily handed over towards a payment, the holder may complete it, and the presumptions apply. The absence of the transaction from the payee’s income-tax return does not by itself displace them. | Handing over a signed blank instrument is, in practice, an admission of liability to the extent later filled in. Advise clients accordingly; the defence of misuse rarely succeeds without contemporaneous protest. |
| Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian (2021) 5 SCC 283 · SC (3J) · Admission of signature | Once the signature is admitted, the statutory presumptions are triggered and the adjudicating court is bound to draw them. A mere denial of the debt, unsupported by material, does not amount to a probable defence. | Do not admit the signature and then contest the instrument on assertion alone. If the signature is genuinely disputed, take that plea at the outset and seek expert comparison. |
| Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant (2022) 6 SCC 735 · SC (2J) · The complainant’s means | A complainant is not required, in his complaint or examination-in-chief, to prove his financial capacity to advance the sum. The question arises only where the accused raises it and lays some foundation for it. | For the drawer, capacity must be raised in the reply notice and pursued in cross-examination; raised for the first time in argument, it will not be entertained. |
Who answers — the company, the director and section 141
Where the drawer is a company, liability is derivative and graded. The company must be in the array of accused; the managing director and the signatory answer by virtue of office; everyone else answers only on what the complaint actually alleges.
a firm, an association of individuals or any other body corporate · Explanation to s. 141
Liable by office
No averment beyond the description is required. The office itself supplies the responsibility for the conduct of the business.
Liable on averment
The complaint must say so in terms. Reproducing the statutory words without particulars is not enough, and the defect is taken at summoning.
Liable only on consent, connivance or neglect
The complaint must allege that the offence was committed with his consent or connivance, or is attributable to his neglect, with the material to support it.
| Authority | Ratio decidendi | Practice insight |
|---|---|---|
| S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89 · SC (3J) · s. 141(1); the necessary averment | Liability under s. 141 arises from being in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, and the complaint must aver this specifically. The managing director and the signatory of the cheque are liable by virtue of their position without further averment. | Take the averment objection at summoning, when it is cheapest. Against a managing director or the signatory, abandon it and move to the debt, the notice and limitation. |
| National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal (2010) 3 SCC 330 · SC (2J) · Specificity of the averment | The averment must be clear and specific; reproducing the statutory language is not enough, and the distinct requirements of ss. 141(1) and 141(2) must be separately made out. A director with no nexus to the transaction cannot be prosecuted. | For independent, nominee and non-executive directors, attack the pleading itself rather than contest facts through a full trial. |
| K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora (2009) 10 SCC 48 · SC (2J) · The graded categories | Section 141 is graded: persons in charge under sub-section (1) require a specific averment; managing and joint managing directors are liable by office; every other director, manager, secretary or officer is liable only on an averment of consent, connivance or neglect. | The drafting checklist for both sides — identify the category, then the averment required, then the evidence needed to sustain or defeat it. |
| Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 5 SCC 661 · SC (3J) · The company as principal offender | Arraignment of the company is a condition precedent to prosecuting its directors or signatories; derivative liability cannot survive the absence of the principal offender, save on a genuine legal impediment such as dissolution. | Check the array of parties before anything else. The defect is ordinarily incurable once limitation for a fresh complaint has run. |
| S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy v. Snehalatha Elangovan (2022) 10 SCC 140 · SC (2J) · Quashing and the basic averment | Where the complaint contains the basic averment that the director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business, the burden lies on him to establish his non-involvement by unimpeachable material. The High Court will not weigh a disputed defence under s. 482. | A resignation before the cheque date, evidenced by Form DIR-12 as filed, is the paradigm of unimpeachable material. Anything requiring evidence belongs to the trial. |
Where it is filed, and how it is tried
Territorial jurisdiction was moved by the Court in 2014 and moved back by Parliament in 2015. The trial that follows is a summary one, and the Supreme Court has twice issued directions to keep it moving.
Before the 2015 amendment
The complaint lay only where the offence was completed — that is, before the court within whose jurisdiction the drawee bank, on which the cheque was drawn, was situated. Payees who had sued at their own place found their complaints returned, and the decision was reversed by Parliament within a year.
Section 142(2), as inserted in 2015
Where the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the court within whose jurisdiction the branch of the payee’s bank lies. Where it is presented otherwise than through an account, the court where the branch of the drawee bank lies. The payee, in practice, sues at home.
One drawer, one court
All complaints against the same drawer, arising out of any number of dishonoured cheques, are to be tried together by the court first seised · s. 142(2) proviso and s. 142A(2)
| Authority | Ratio decidendi | Practice insight |
|---|---|---|
| Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 9 SCC 129 · SC (3J) · Jurisdiction; since superseded | The offence is completed on the dishonour of the cheque, and the complaint lies only before the court within whose jurisdiction the drawee bank is situated. (Superseded by s. 142(2), inserted by the Amendment Act of 2015.) | Of historical importance only, but still cited on the anterior question of where the offence is committed. For any live matter the answer is s. 142(2), not this case. |
| Bridgestone India Pvt. Ltd. v. Inderpal Singh (2016) 2 SCC 75 · SC (2J) · s. 142(2); retrospective operation | Section 142(2), read with the validating provision in s. 142A, applies to complaints pending when the amendment came into force and displaces Dashrath Rupsingh. Jurisdiction lies where the branch of the payee’s bank, through which the cheque was presented for collection, is situated. | File where the payee banks. Where a complaint was returned under the old rule, it may be presented afresh before the court the amendment designates. |
| Indian Bank Association v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 590 · SC (2J) · Directions for speedy trial | Directions were issued for the conduct of s. 138 trials — scrutiny of the complaint on the day of filing, issue of summons with the complaint and documents, and an endeavour to conclude within six months of filing under s. 143. | The template for an application to expedite. Attach the directions and identify which of them the trial court has not followed. |
| In re Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 (2021) 16 SCC 116 · SC (5J) · Suo motu directions | Further directions were issued: an inquiry under s. 202 CrPC need not precede the issue of process where the accused resides outside jurisdiction; a Magistrate cannot recall summons already issued; and complaints against the same drawer arising from a single transaction are to be tried together. | The current working authority on procedure. It forecloses the recall-of-summons application that had become a routine delaying step. |
| Meters and Instruments Pvt. Ltd. v. Kanchan Mehta (2018) 1 SCC 560 · SC (2J) · Summary trial; partly doubted | The offence is primarily a civil wrong with a compensatory purpose; where the cheque amount with interest and costs is paid, the court may close the proceeding even without the complainant’s consent. (This last proposition was doubted in the 2021 suo motu reference.) | Cite with care. The compensatory characterisation remains good; the suggestion that a case may be closed over the payee’s objection should not be relied on without noting the doubt. |
What the drawer pays, and when
The 2018 amendment shifted the economics of the section. Interim compensation may be ordered before conviction, a deposit is the price of an appeal, and the sentence itself is in practice an order to pay.
SECTION 143A
- Up to twenty per cent of the cheque amount
- On the plea of not guilty, or on summons in a summary trial
- The power is discretionary — “may”, not “shall”
- Applies only to offences committed after 1 September 2018
- Recoverable as a fine; repayable with interest on acquittal
SECTION 148
- A minimum of twenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded
- In addition to anything paid under s. 143A
- The appellate court ordinarily grants it, and records reasons if it does not
- Applies to appeals against convictions in complaints filed before the amendment
- Payable within sixty days, extendable by thirty
SECTIONS 138 AND 357
- Fine may extend to twice the amount of the cheque
- Compensation is the practical remedy, not the sentence
- The cheque amount with interest is the ordinary measure
- Default sentence under s. 64 IPC secures payment
- The offence is in substance a civil wrong given criminal teeth
| Authority | Ratio decidendi | Practice insight |
|---|---|---|
| R. Vijayan v. Baby (2012) 1 SCC 260 · SC (2J) · Compensation as the real remedy | In s. 138 cases the practical relief is compensation under s. 357 CrPC rather than imprisonment, and courts should ordinarily award a sum equal to the cheque amount with appropriate interest, so that the payee is not driven to a separate civil suit. | Ask for the cheque amount plus interest and costs in terms, with a default sentence. A compensation order is executable as a fine and is more valuable than a short imprisonment. |
| Kaushalya Devi Massand v. Roopkishore Khore (2011) 4 SCC 593 · SC (2J) · The nature of the offence | The offence under s. 138 is almost in the nature of a civil wrong to which criminal consequences have been attached, and the gravity of the sentence must be assessed accordingly; a fine with compensation will usually meet the ends of justice. | The sentencing authority to cite for a first-time drawer who has paid or offered to pay. Pair it with a tender of the cheque amount before the sentencing hearing. |
| G.J. Raja v. Tejraj Surana (2019) 19 SCC 469 · SC (2J) · s. 143A; prospective only | Section 143A is substantive, creating a liability that did not exist before, and operates prospectively. It cannot be applied to complaints in respect of cheques dishonoured before 1 September 2018. | Check the dishonour date before resisting or seeking interim compensation. For older cheques the application does not lie at all. |
| Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi (2019) 11 SCC 341 · SC (2J) · s. 148; the appeal deposit | Section 148 is procedural, regulating an existing appellate remedy, and applies to appeals arising out of complaints filed before the amendment. The word “may” ordinarily requires the appellate court to direct a deposit of not less than twenty per cent, with reasons recorded for any departure. | Advise a convicted drawer that suspension of sentence in appeal will in practice cost twenty per cent up front. Budget for it before filing. |
| Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand 2024 SCC OnLine SC 309 · SC (2J) · s. 143A; the discretion | The power under s. 143A is discretionary, not mandatory. The court must consider the prima facie merits of the complaint and the defence, the financial position of the accused and the conduct of the parties, and pass a reasoned order; the quantum is not to be fixed mechanically at twenty per cent. | Resist a mechanical order by putting the defence and the drawer’s means on affidavit at the s. 143A stage. Conversely, a payee should address the merits, not merely the dishonour. |
Ending it without a verdict — compounding, settlement and quashing
Most of these matters end in payment rather than judgment. Section 147 makes the offence compoundable, but the Court has priced delay into the exercise and has kept the complainant’s consent at the centre of it.
COMPOUNDING UNDER SECTION 147
The graded costs the Court directed, payable to the Legal Services Authority
| At the first or second hearing | No costs — compounding as of course |
| Thereafter, before the Magistrate | 10 per cent of the cheque amount |
| Before the Sessions Court or the High Court | 15 per cent of the cheque amount |
| Before the Supreme Court | 20 per cent of the cheque amount |
CONSENT IS INDISPENSABLE
Compounding requires the complainant’s consent. Section 147 makes the offence compoundable but does not dispense with the agreement of the person aggrieved, and s. 320 CrPC is not attracted in terms.
JIK Industries v. Amarlal V. Jumani, (2012) 3 SCC 255SETTLEMENT OF ONE COMPLAINT MAY END THE OTHER
Where a settlement deed is itself acted upon and a cheque under it is dishonoured, the payee may pursue the later complaint; permitting both to run would allow recovery twice over on a single debt.
Gimpex Pvt. Ltd. v. Manoj Goel, (2022) 11 SCC 705THE PROCEEDING IS QUASI-CRIMINAL
The object is compensation to the payee rather than punishment of the drawer. Courts lean towards a monetary resolution, and imprisonment is reserved for the recalcitrant.
Kaushalya Devi Massand v. Roopkishore Khore, (2011) 4 SCC 593| Authority | Ratio decidendi | Practice insight |
|---|---|---|
| Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663 · SC (3J) · s. 147; graded costs | Guidelines were laid down for compounding: it is to be allowed without demur at the first or second hearing; thereafter on payment of ten per cent of the cheque amount as costs to the Legal Services Authority, rising to fifteen per cent before the Sessions Court or High Court and twenty per cent before the Supreme Court. | Settle early or pay for the delay. Where a settlement is in prospect, record it at the earliest hearing to avoid the graded costs. |
| JIK Industries Ltd. v. Amarlal V. Jumani (2012) 3 SCC 255 · SC (2J) · Consent to compounding | Section 147 makes the offence compoundable but does not dispense with the requirement of the complainant’s consent; the general law of compounding is not displaced, and a court cannot compound over the payee’s objection. | The payee’s consent is the currency. A drawer seeking to compound must negotiate, not apply; a unilateral deposit does not compel compounding. |
| A.C. Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 11 SCC 790 · SC (3J) · Complaint through an attorney | A complaint may be filed and the complainant’s evidence given by a power-of-attorney holder, provided he has witnessed the transaction or is otherwise aware of it and the authority is on record; the specific assertion of knowledge should appear in the complaint. | For institutional payees, plead the authority and the deponent’s personal knowledge in the complaint itself. For the defence, the absence of either is a live point at summoning. |
| Gimpex Pvt. Ltd. v. Manoj Goel (2022) 11 SCC 705 · SC (2J) · Settlement and parallel complaints | Where a settlement agreement is entered into and a cheque issued under it is itself dishonoured, the payee may proceed on the later complaint; allowing both the original and the settlement complaints to continue would permit recovery twice over on one debt. | Draft the settlement to state expressly what happens to the pending complaint on default, and whether the original cause of action revives. |
| Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 · SC (3J) · s. 482; quashing on settlement | The inherent power of the High Court to quash a criminal proceeding on a compromise is distinct from compounding under s. 320 CrPC. Where the dispute is predominantly civil or commercial in character and the parties have settled, continuing the prosecution would be an abuse of process and the proceeding may be quashed. | The route where compounding is refused or the stage is advanced. Place the settlement, proof of payment and the payee’s no-objection on record; the petition is under s. 482, not s. 147. |
The perimeter — defences that work and defences that do not
The section has been read widely enough to catch every ordinary evasion, and narrowly enough to exclude a cheque that answers no subsisting liability. The recurring defences fall on one side of that line or the other.
WITHIN SECTION 138
closure is only the most emphatic form of insufficiency
a stop-payment instruction attracts the section unless the drawer shows there were funds and no liability
a mismatch, or an incomplete or altered instrument, is within the mischief
“any cheque” in s. 138 is not confined to the cheque of the principal debtor
the drawer cannot escape by calling the instrument a security
OUTSIDE SECTION 138
a cheque for a debt barred by limitation, or for no consideration at all, is outside the section
a cheque issued as a gift, or for a purpose other than the discharge of a liability, attracts no offence
the offence is incomplete and cognizance cannot be taken
the proceeding is stayed against the corporate debtor — but not against its directors or the signatory
no director may be convicted where the company has not been arraigned
| Authority | Ratio decidendi | Practice insight |
|---|---|---|
| Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat (2012) 13 SCC 375 · SC (2J) · The forms of dishonour | The expression “amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient” is not confined to a shortfall of funds. A return for a signature mismatch, or because the account has been closed, or on a stop-payment instruction, falls within s. 138. | The return memo’s wording is not decisive. A drawer relying on the form of the memo must still show that funds were available and no liability subsisted. |
| I.C.D.S. Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer (2002) 6 SCC 426 · SC (2J) · “any cheque” | The words “any cheque” in s. 138 are of wide import and are not confined to a cheque drawn by the principal debtor. A cheque issued by a guarantor towards the discharge of the guaranteed liability attracts the section. | Guarantor cheques are actionable in their own right. When taking security, a cheque from the guarantor is worth more than an additional covenant. |
| Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1002 · SC (2J) · The security cheque | A cheque issued as security is not for that reason outside s. 138. If the underlying liability has become due and payable and the cheque is presented thereafter, its dishonour attracts the section; what matters is whether a debt subsisted on the date of presentation. | The label on the cheque is immaterial. For the drawer, the defence must be that no liability had crystallised — which requires the underlying contract, not an assertion. |
| Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 16 SCC 762 · SC (2J) · Debt or liability; quashing | The expression “debt or other liability” is to be construed having regard to the object of the provision; a cheque issued in the course of a subsisting commercial arrangement is within it. Quashing at the threshold is not warranted where the question requires evidence. | Threshold quashing succeeds only where the complaint, taken at its highest, discloses no offence. Anything turning on the state of accounts belongs to the trial. |
| P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258 · SC (3J) · IBC moratorium; s. 14 | A proceeding under s. 138 is quasi-criminal in nature and, as against the corporate debtor, is stayed by the moratorium under s. 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. The directors and signatories liable under s. 141 enjoy no such protection. | The insolvency shield protects the company, not the hands that signed. Guarantors and signatories should not assume the moratorium travels to them. |
BOTTOM LINE
The section has been read as what it is — a commercial remedy wearing criminal dress. The courts will presume the debt from the signature (Rangappa), let the payee present the cheque again (MSR Leathers), catch the closed account and the stopped payment alike (Laxmi Dyechem), reach the guarantor’s cheque and the security cheque (Beena Shabeer, Sripati Singh), and treat compensation rather than imprisonment as the object (R. Vijayan). But the section is not a debt-collection statute with the trouble taken out of it: a complaint filed a day early is void (Yogendra Pratap Singh), a director is not liable by his designation (Harmeet Singh Paintal), no one is liable at all if the company is left out (Aneeta Hada), and interim compensation is a discretion to be exercised on reasons (Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava). Rigour and pragmatism, held in the same hand. For the practitioner the working lesson is that these cases are usually decided on the file rather than at the bar: the return memo, the dispatch record, the reply to the notice and the array of accused settle more of them than argument ever does.
This Case Law Insights is for information purpose only and should not be taken as legal advice. To know further details, clarification, assistance or any advice on cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 or any legal advice on complaint drafting/ director liability/ interim compensation/ compounding and settlement etc. or any legal issues on debt recovery and commercial dispute resolution you may connect with us at admin@equicorplegal.com / 08448824659 and visit www.equicorplegal.com
